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Abstract
We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of dynamic pricing technologies
(DPT), which enable precise inferring of consumers valuations for firms products and personalized pricing.
These technologies enable first-degree price discrimination: firms charge different prices to different
consumers, based on their willingness to pay. We first show that, even though the monopolist makes a higher
profit with DPT, its optimal quality is the same with or without DPT. Next we show that in a duopoly setting,
dynamic pricing adds value only if it is associated with product differentiation. We then consider a model of
vertical product differentiation, and show how dynamic pricing on the Internet affects firms choices of quality
differentiation in a competitive scenario. We find that when the high quality firm adopts DPT both firms raise
their quality. Conversely, when the low quality firm adopts DPT, both firms lower their quality.  While it is
optimal for the firm adopting DPT to increase product differentiation, the non-DPT firm seeks to reduce
differentiation by moving closer in the quality space. Our model also points out firms optimal pricing
strategies with DPT, which may be non-monotonic in consumer valuations. Finally, we show that consumer
surplus is highest when both firms adopt DPT. Thus, despite the threat of first-degree price discrimination,
dynamic pricing with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare. 
Keywords:  Dynamic pricing, product differentiation, electronic retailing, information economics
1  INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the near future, firms will have the wherewithal to use the waves of personal profile and consumer and supplier activity data
to set personalized prices for different consumers. Retailers using the Internet as a medium for commerce can gather a remarkable
wealth of information about their existing and potential consumers and hence better estimate a consumers reservation price. As
Bakos (2001) mentions, technology allows firms to identify and track individual consumers, both within an online store and across
different Websites. This leads to the creation of consumer profiles through various collaborative and content filtering techniques.
Based on such information, the Internet retailers Web server can deploy complex pricebots and algorithms to determine prices
to approach first degree price discrimination (Bailey 1998). Spurred partly by the low menu cost of changing prices on the Internet
and partly as a response to consumer use of price-comparison bots, firms are exploring the idea of dynamic prices for goods and
services that are currently sold at posted prices. 
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Dynamic pricing, or personalized pricing, has been defined as gauging a shoppers desire, measuring his means, and then charging
accordingly. We refer to this technology as DPT, for short. A retailer that invests in DPT can identify individual consumers, infer
consumer valuations, and form perfect estimations of consumers willingness to pay for its product. This retailer can, therefore,
offer a personalized price that provides greater surplus relative to the potential surplus from the competitors product. 
There are many recent examples of dynamic pricing among online retailers. A well-known example, of course, is Amazon.com,
which varied prices to different consumers on its popular Diamond Rio MP3 player by up to $50 from the original $233 retail
tag (Morneau 2000). Later on, over a 5-day period, Amazon offered discounts of 20 to 40 percent off the list price on 68 of its
100 most popular DVD titles, which again differed by consumer. This promotion resulted in the same title being sold at a price
ranging from $24 to $39. 
One way for a retailer to engage in price discrimination is through intelligent agents dynamically inserting personalized discounts
on pop-up windows on a consumers screen. Software for this is provided by, among others, iChoose, Dash, and zBubbles
(Johnson 2000). In the North American long-distance telephone market, the major competitors (AT&T, MCI, and Sprint) have
been able to provide specialized discounts to a majority of the population. Further, Ford plans to move toward pricing its
automobile financing products dynamically, based on consumer profiles and choices, and expects to cut its $10 billion spending
on non-targeted promotions significantly (Aron, et al. 2001). Calicos Dynamic Custom Price application enables sellers to offer
personalized prices (see www.calico.com). Banks and airlines use modern information technology to track individual customers
and make them personalized offers (Winnet 2000). Financial services companies such as Capital One use profiles based on
hundreds of variables to tailor products and prices for specific clients (McDonell 2001). Travel also is a ripe area for personalized
pricing because travel services change prices rapidly. Travelocity already uses data warehouse technology that enables it to tailor
rates to specific customers. Bid.com claims that its software allows Internet sites to analyze their customers' shopping patterns
and set prices accordingly.  Amadeus, a travel booking system, says sites using its system are able to offer prices tailored for
different customers (Khan 2000).
Many firms believe that the concept of making the right offer to the right consumer will be the way of the future. In this paper,
we intend to examine the following questions. How does competition between online retailers, in the presence of intelligent agents
and price bots that can extract buyer preferences and implement dynamic pricing, affect equilibrium outcomes in a competitive
scenario? What is the impact of such technologies on  product positioning when firms compete on the quality of value added
services? Does the improvement in firms knowledge of individual consumers alleviate or intensify price competition? 
We consider these questions in a duopoly framework in which one or both firms can perfectly identify valuations of heterogenous
consumers. Recent work on price discrimination and customization includes Ulph and Vulkan (2001), who find that a firm that
first-degree price discriminates is also better off if it mass-customizes. In a monopoly setting, Aron et al. (2001) analyze the
pricing, profitability, and welfare implications of agent-based technologies that price dynamically, based on product preference
information revealed by consumers. 
2 MODEL
We consider vertical differentiation in a dynamic pricing context. Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986)
develop duopoly models of vertical differentiation. These papers have shown that the strategic effect of the desire to reduce price
competition results in a product equilibrium where firms seek maximal product differentiation. Moorthy (1988) extends the basic
model by incorporating variable production costs and allowing consumers the opportunity to not buy a product. This results in
less than maximal product differentiation. Our analysis extends Moorthys model by allowing that one or both firms be equipped
with a technology that perfectly reveals the consumers type before the price is disclosed to the consumer. 
In our model, firms compete in both the quality and price of the products they offer. Formally, we model their competition as a
three-stage game. At the first stage, firms simultaneously choose the quality levels of their products. At stage two, the two firms
simultaneously choose their prices. Finally, at the last stage, given the quality levels and prices offered by the two firms,
consumers decide which, if any, product to buy. We consider pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of this three-stage game
using backward induction. Consumers are modelled as utility maximizers. If a consumer purchases a product of quality  q at price
p, his utility is U(2) = 2qp, where  2 g [0,1]. The type parameter 2 indicates a consumers marginal valuation for quality. A
consumer buys one unit of the product that maximizes his surplus. Otherwise, he chooses not to buy either product. 
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Consistent with prior literature, we assume that both firms have the same marginal cost function for production which is invariant
with the quantity, but depends on the quality of the product. Hence depending on the quality levels they choose, their marginal
costs will differ in equilibrium. The marginal cost of producing a good of quality q  is c(q) = q2. The quadratic functional form
for the marginal costs is a pertinent way of capturing a property pivotal to our model, which is that marginal costs increase with
quality and at a faster rate than consumers willingness to pay. If the latter were untrue, then it would be optimal to supply each
consumer with infinitely high quality, which would be unrealistic in real life.  Quality is observed by all consumers at no extra
cost.
Quality in this model is a broad notion that could include features intrinsic to the product itself (such as durability and
functionality) or the service level provided by the firm (such as extended warranties, forgiving return policies on defective items,
special gift services, superior customer service and support contracts, fast delivery times with low costs, and so on. In equilibrium,
the chosen quality levels satisfy 0 < qi < 1 . In practice, a dynamic pricing technology of this nature is likely to incur some fixed
costs but, for simplicity, we treat these costs as zero. Adding a fixed cost does not change the qualitative nature of our results.
We assume that consumers cannot practice arbritrage among themselves.
2.1 Monopoly Case
Consider first a monopoly with uniform pricing.  Let qnm and pnm be the quality and price, respectively, offered by the firm in this
case where the superscript n refers to the fact that the firm does not have DPT and the subscript m denotes the fact that it is a
monopolist. Next, define qdm and pdm()  as the quality level and price, respectively, offered by a monopolist with DPT where the
superscript d denotes the fact that the monopolist has DPT technology. Since this firm observes consumer types before choosing
its price, pdm(2)  will be a function of consumer type 2 and is given by, pdm(2)=q2. This price function is, trivially, increasing in
2:  higher consumer types pay higher prices. Further, the firm is willing to price as low as marginal cost, to persuade a consumer
to buy the product. At this price, the lowest consumer type willing to buy is 2dm =c/qdm. 
Proposition 1:  In equilibrium, regardless of DPT, a monopolist sets the same quality level, that is, qd*m = qn*m . Further, profits
are doubled by the DPT firm. Bdm  = 2Bnm .
Increasing (decreasing) quality implies a trade off between increasing (decreasing) costs and decreased (increased) market
penetration for the firm. By pricing at marginal cost for the threshold consumer, DPT gives it the ability to reach a previously
untapped portion of the market without changing its product quality. This case provides a benchmark to the one in which one of
two duopolists obtain a DPT technology. As we show in the next section, in the latter case, qualities of both firms typically change
in response to the availability of DPT. 
2.2 Duopoly with Dynamic Pricing:  No Quality Differentiation
We next turn to the duopoly case, with two firms in the market. We first show that the ability to price discriminate, by itself, is
of no value unless firms also differentiate in quality. Suppose that one or both firms have access to DPT. 
Proposition 2:  Suppose both firms offer the same quality, so that q1= q2 =q. Then DPT offers no advantage to a firm, and both
firms earn zero profit. In equilibrium, ph(2)=pl(2)=c(q) and Ah =A l = 0.
Thus, even when one of the firms possesses a technology (DPT) of extracting consumer valuations and pricing accordingly, it
does not have any competitive advantage in the absence of some form of product differentiation. This implies that online retailers
will choose not to indulge in dynamic pricing, unless they can also provide value-added services to differentiate their product.
We, therefore, turn to the case in which firms first choose the quality of their product, and then the price. 
2.3 Differentiated Duopoly:  Neither Firm Has DPT
As a benchmark case, we first assume that neither firm has access to DPT. We call this case the no-DPT case. When there is no
access to DPT, firm i, (i = h, l), chooses a quality qni  and price pni, where the superscript n indicates that neither firm has DPT.
In equilibrium qnh > qnl  and pnh > pnl . Henceforth the superscripts l, h, and b will indicate the scenarios when only one firm has
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2.3.1  Price Competition at Stage 2
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Now, consider stage 2 of the game, where we solve for the prices chosen by the firms at stage 2.  Given these prices, we now
consider firms choices of quality levels at stage 1. 
2.3.2 Quality Competition at Stage 1
At this stage, firms anticipate the prices they will choose at stage 2 (as a function of the qualities chosen at stage 1) and their
resulting profits at stage 3. The first-order condition for firm h, MBnh / Mqnh = 0 defines a reaction function for firm h. Similarly,
the first-order condition, MBnl / Mqnl  = 0 denotes the reaction function of firm l.  The equilibrium quality levels qn*h =0.41, qn*l =
0.19, are determined by solving these two equations simultaneously. 
2.4 Duopoly with Dynamic Pricing:  Only One Firm Has DPT
We now consider the situation in which one firm has access to DPT, i.e., it can infer consumer valuations and form a perfect
estimate of each consumers willingness to pay for its product. There are two equilibria in this case:  one in which the DPT firm
chooses a lower quality than the other firm, and a second one in which the DPT firm chooses a higher quality. 
2.4.1 DPT Firm Offers Low Quality
We denote the equilibrium qualities in this case as ql*h ,ql*l  with pl*h , pl*l(2) denoting the equilibrium prices. In this case, firm l
knows the type of each consumer, and hence can offer prices that depend on 2. In equilibrium, it must be willing to offer a price
as low as its marginal cost, c = q2, to each consumer, if necessary. Further, consistent with price discrimination, it will charge as
high a price as it can from each consumer to whom it sells. At stage 3, firm h (which does not have DPT in this case) will operate
in a market segment [2lh,1] and firm l  in a market segment [2lh,2ll].  




























We show that the equilibrium price function of firm l is non-monotonic in consumer type; that is, it charges some high valuation
consumers less than it charges some low valuation consumers. 
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Figure 1.  Prices of Firms When l Alone Has DPT
This situation is depicted in Figure 1. The intuition for the non-monotonicity of pll (2), is that in the market segment [0,2'] firm
l faces no competition from firm h. These consumers are not willing to buy product h at the offered quality and price. Hence, firm
l  is able to extract their entire consumer surplus, and consumers in this range are left with no surplus. However, consumers in
the range [2',1] obtain a positive utility from consuming product h  as well. Hence, firm l faces competition in this range, and must
offer consumers at least as high a surplus as firm , to induce them to buy product l. Thus, these consumers have a positive surplus
that is monotonically increasing in consumer type.  Substituting in the optimal price of firm h, the equilibrium price schedule for
firm l is as given in Proposition 3.
2.4.2 DPT Firm Offers High Quality
We denote the equilibrium qualities in this case as qh*h , qh*l  with ph*l , ph*h(2) denoting the equilibrium prices. In this case, firm
h knows the type of each consumer, and is hence willing to price as low as phh (2) = chh if need be. At stage 3, firm l (which does
not have DPT in this case) will operate in a market segment [2hl ,2hh] and firm h in a market segment [2hh ,1]. The first-order

































Proposition 4 : When the lower quality firm gets DPT the optimal quality levels being offered by both firms decrease, i.e.,














DPT provides firm  l with an opportunity to penetrate an untapped market segment further to the left than where it presently is,
at the same time allowing it to remain competitive on the right. Hence it lowers its quality such that it can extend its reach further
to the left in the direction of decreasing consumer type. Further, to remain competitive, firm h  reduces its price. As a competitive
response to differentiate itself, h   initially moves to the right as long as moving away is relatively inexpensive due to low
convexity of its costs. But when the costs start increasing at a much faster rate, the potential loss per unit of market share on the
right is outweighed by the gains from moving to the left. By moving toward the low quality firm, h increases the uncontested
portion of its market share on the right where it faces no competition from l. Thus, both firms reduce their qualities when the DPT
firm chooses a low quality. A similar intuition holds when the high firm gets DPT.
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2.4.3 Both Firms Have DPT


























Figure 2 depicts firms pricing scedules, with the shaded triangles representing firms profits.  The maximal price firm h can
charge any consumer 2 is the price at which he is exactly indifferent between buying the low quality product at  the lowest price
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Figure 2.  Pricing Schedule and Profits When Both Firms Have DPT
Proposition 5:   When both firms have DPT,  the equilibrium qualities,  qb*h   and  qb*l   satisfy ql*h < qb*h < qh*h  and ql*l < qb*l  < qh*l,
that  is, the high  quality firm will lower its quality and the low quality firm will raise its quality, compared to the  equilibrium
situation when neither firm adopts DPT.
Thus when both firms decide to acquire DPT, the manner in which they would change their qualities also merits attention. If the
high quality firm has DPT and the low quality firm decides to deploy DPT as well, then both firms should reduce their quality
levels. Conversely, if the low quality firm has DPT and the high quality firm decides to acquire it, then both firms should raise
their quality levels. This implies that both firms actually come closer to each other. The intensified competition actually leaves
both firms worse off than the no-DPT case. But if one firm did adopt DPT and the other did not, then the latter is much worse-off,
thereby forcing them both to adopt DPT. This is a classic example of the Prisoners Dilemma.
Proposition 61:  Consumer surplus increases (decreases) when the low (high) quality firm adopts DPT and is the highest when
both firms have DPT. 
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consumers of firm , and a corresponding increase in welfare. 
Consumer surplus falls (compared to the no dynamic pricing case) if the DPT firm has low quality, but rises if the DPT firm has
high quality. When firm l has DPT, it extends its market reach to a previously untapped segment, since it can price as low as
marginal cost. However, a segment of its consumers receive no surplus, since they pay a price exactly equal to their willingness
to pay. Conversely, if firm h has DPT, it faces competition from firm l  throughout its market segment, and  so is forced to concede
some surplus to consumers.  In fact, consumer surplus is highest when both firms have DPT. In that case, due to the intensified
competition, the average price of both firms is the lowest of all cases. Further, their overall market coverage is at its highest since
each firm can now encroach upon a hitherto untapped market segment by offering consumers their exact utility. Finally, in
Table 1, we summarize our results for quadratic, cubic, and quartic cost structures with Figures 3 and 4. 
Observation 1:  (i) In equilibrium, the profits of the firm with DPT, always increase, irrespective of whether it is the high or the
low quality firm.
(ii) However, for a convex cost function of the nature  c = q", there exists an  " , [2,3] such that beyond it, the high quality firm
does not benefit from DPT and hence only the low quality firm will adopt DPT.  









Firm h, Firm l Firm h, Firm l Firm h, Firm l Firm h, Firm l
Qualities (q2) 0.409, 0.199 0.388, 0.164 0.444, 0,222 0.4, 0.2
Profits 0.0164, 0,012 0.0112, 0.0177 0.022, 0.0055 0.016, 0.008
Qualities (q3) 0.515, 0.29 0.485, 0.242 0.358, 0.559 0.503, 0.322
Profits 0.028, 0.019 0.021, 0.025 0.0275, 0.0085 0.0209, 0.0099
Qualities (q4) 0.582, 0.354 0.549, 0.296 0,452, 0.628 0.57, 0.41
Profits 0.0369, 0.0219 0.0284, 0.279 0.0268, 0.0097 0.0213, 0.0099
3 DISCUSSION
In this section, we derive managerial implications of our results. Electronic retailers can now gather information about consumer
needs and can customize their prices to give their consumers exactly what they want, at exactly the price they are willing to bear.
In a recent survey of online retailers (Johnson 2000), 57 percent of retailers surveyed planned to offer multiple prices for the same
item, and 71 percent expected to have preferred pricing for regular consumers.
Our model points out certain interesting pricing strategies for firms. If the low quality firm deploys DPT, then it is optimal for
it to use a non-monotonic price schedule. This implies that certain high valuation consumers are charged lower prices than some
lower valuation consumers. This counterintuitive result holds because in a segment of high valuation consumers, the firm with
DPT finds itself competing with a high quality firm (that does not have DPT). To induce these consumers to buy its product, the
firm needs a declining price schedule. Conversely, in a segment of the market with low valuations, the DPT firm is a local
monopolist, and can afford to charge consumers exactly their willingness to pay. It is important to note that given these
technologies, it is easy to get into a spiralling price war. In order to avoid this, firms need to increase product differentiation either
by providing some value added services or by adding features to the product to enhance its durability or functionality. 
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Figure 3.  Firm ls Profits with Convexity of Costs " Figure 4.  Firm hs Profits with Convexity of Costs "
We also identify how firms should make different product quality choices, given that one firm has decided to acquire DPT. When
a low quality firm acquires DPT, its best response is to lower its quality level. This can be done through removal of additional
product features or value-added services. In such a scenario, the high quality firm is better off also reducing its quality level.
Conversely, if the high quality firm acquires DPT, both firms should provide additional product features or services to increase
their quality levels. 
Finally, our model also demonstrates that consumers would benefit if higher quality firms adopt DPT. In the event that all firms
adopt DPT, consumers would benefit the most. Thus we conclude that strategies approaching first degree price discrimination
on the Internet should eventually lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare, which is quite in contrast to popular perceptions.
Our model of vertical differentiation in the online retail business-to-consumer market shows how first degree price discrimination
on the Internet will affect firms choice of quality or service differentiation in a competitive scenario. Our paper points out many
counterintutive results, which have significant real world implications. In the future, we intend to extend our setting to incorporate
product customization such that firms combine DPT with customization and then tailor their products. 
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qnm, qdm Qualities offered by a monopolist when it does not and does have DPT
qnh,qnl Qualities of high and low firm when neither firm has DPT
qhl ,qll Qualities of high and low firm when Low firm has DPT
qhh ,qlh Qualities of high and low firm when High firm has DPT
qhb ,qlb Qualities of high and low firm when both firms have DPT
pij(q) Price of firm i as a function of consumer valuation when the firm j has DPT.
2i 
j Market share cutoff of firm i when firm j has DPT
Proof of Proposition 1
Define 2nm = pnm/qnm.  The monopolists profit function, therefore, is 
Bnm = (1-2n m)(pnm-qnm2) (6)
The optimal quality level, therefore, is determined by first solving for optimal price p* and then plugging p* in (1)  and then
equating the first order condition (MBnm/Mqnm ) = 0. This gives qn*m  = 1/3. 
Next, the profit function of the DPT monopolist is
Bdm (qdm)= ò(pdm()-qdm2)d (7)
From here we can show that the optimal quality is given by  qd*m  = 1/3. Thus we show that, regardless of the availability of DPT,
a monopolist firm chooses the same quality.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that q1 = q2. If neither firm has access to DPT, the proposition is immediate. Consider the case that firm 1 has DPT and
firm 2 does not. Suppose p2 > c(q1). Firm 1 will never charge p1(2) > p2 to any consumer 2, since the consumer will buy product
2 instead. Further, by the usual Bertrand argument, firm 1 will not charge p1(2) = p2 either. By charging a price , below p2, firm
1 ensures that consumer 2 buys its product. Suppose p1(2) > c(q1) for some consumer 2. Then, firm 2 can capture a positive market
share by charging p2 0 (c(q1),p1(2)). Hence, the only equilibrium is the Bertrand one, p1(2) = p2 = c(q1) for all consumers 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3
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Next, consider firm l. Firm l will set its price for each consumer, pl l(2), as high as possible to satisfy two restrictions:  (i) the
consumer buys product l instead of product h, so that 
2qll- pl l(2) $ 2qhl- phl
pl l(2) # phl-2(qhl- ql l), 
and (ii) the consumer buys product l, rather than not consume at all. That is, 
2qll- pl l(2) $ 0, or pl l(2) # 2ql l. 
Further, firm l must set pl l(2) $ cl l = cl l(ql l) for each consumer, else it makes a loss on that consumer, and would prefer to not sell
to him. Hence, we have pll(2) $ cll, and pll(2) # min{2qll, phl -_2(qhl-ql l)}. The first term in the latter inequality is defined by the
consumer's reservation utility (i.e., zero), and the second term can be interpreted as his incentive compatibility constraint: if this
is violated, then he buys product h instead. Given that 2 = [(phl)/(qhl)] as defined, it is immediate that phl- 2(qhl- ql l) > 2ql l for 2
> 2, and phl- 2(qhl- ql l) < 2ql l for 2 < 2. The pricing function for firm l now follows.
Proof of Propositions 4 and  5















































The limits of the integral 2ll , 2' and 2lh  have been defined before. Solving the integral as a closed form and replacing the optimal






















Solving simultaneously the first order conditions   we get the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium solution{ }0,0 =∂∂=∂∂ lhlhllll qq ππ
for optimal qualities as (0.38, 0.164).
Consider the choice of qualities at stage 1, when firm h has DPT. Suppose firm l chooses ql , and firm h chooses qh. Further,
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Solving simultaneously the first order conditions,  we get the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium{ }0,0 =∂∂=∂∂ hlhlhhhh qq ππ
solution for optimal qualities as (4/9, 2/9).
















































































Solving simultaneously the first order conditions,  we get the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium solution{ }0,0 =∂∂=∂∂ blblbhbh qq ππ
for optimal qualities as (2/5,1/5).
